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Abstract. To resolve conflicts among norms, various nonmonotonic formalisms
can be used to perform prioritized normative reasoning. Meanwhile, formal ar-
gumentation provides a way to represent nonmonotonic logics. In this paper, we
propose a representation of prioritized normative reasoning by argumentation.
Using hierarchical abstract normative systems, we define three kinds of priori-
tized normative reasoning approaches, called Greedy, Reduction, and Optimiza-
tion. Then, after formulating an argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract
normative system, we show that for a totally ordered hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system, Greedy and Reduction can be represented in argumentation by ap-
plying the weakest link and the last link principles respectively, and Optimization
can be represented by introducing additional defeats capturing implicit conflicts
between arguments.
1 Introduction
Since the work of Alchourro´n and Makinson [1] on hierarchies of regulations and their
logic, in which a partial ordering on a code of laws or regulations is used to overcome
logical imperfections in the code itself, reasoning with prioritized norms has been a
central challenge in deontic logic [13,4,12].
The goal of this paper is to study the open issue of reasoning with priorities over
norms through the lens of argumentation theory [10]. More precisely, we focus on rea-
soning with the abstract normative system proposed by Tosatto et al. [26], which in turn
is based on Makinson and van der Torre’s approach to input/output logic [20]. In this
system, an abstract norm is represented by an ordered pair (a, x), where the body of the
norm a is thought of as an input, representing some kind of condition or situation, and
the head of the norm x is thought of as an output, representing what the norm tells us
to be obligatory in that situation a. As a consequence, an abstract normative system is
a directed graph (L,N) together with a context C ⊆ L, where L is a set of nodes, and
N ⊆ L×L is the set of abstract norms. When the edge of an abstract normative system
is associated with a number to indicate its priority over the other norms in the system,
we obtain a hierarchical abstract normative system (HANS), which will be formally
defined and studied in the remainder of this paper.
Let us clarify how a hierarchical abstract normative system is defined by considering
the well known Order Puzzle [18] example from the deontic logic literature, which
revolves around three norms.
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“Suppose that there is an agent, called Corporal O’Reilly, and that he is subject
to the commands of three superior officers: a Captain, a Major, and a Colonel.
The Captain, who does not like to be cold, issues a standing order that, during
the winter, the heat should be turned on. The Major, who is concerned about
energy conservation, issues an order that, during the winter, the window should
not be opened. And the Colonel, who does not like to be too warm and does
not care about energy conservation, issues an order that, whenever the heat is
on, the window should be opened.”
h
ow
1
2
3
1: (w,h)
2: (w,¬o)
3: (h,o)
Hierarchical Abstract
Normative System
T
Extensions 
Greedy: {h,¬o}
Reduction: {h,o}
Optimization: {¬o}
Fig. 1. The Order puzzle example, represented using the graphical notation of Tosatto et al. [27]
with edges annotated by norm strength.
Let w, h and o respectively denote the propositions that it is winter, the heat is
turned on, and the window is open. There are three norms (w, h), (w,¬o) and (h, o).
These three norms are visualized in Figure 1, extending the graphical notation de-
scribed in Tosatto et al. [27] by associating edges with numbers denoting priorities of
norms. These priorities are obtained from the rank of the issuer, since Colonels outrank
Majors, and Majors outrank Captains. Within the figure, each circle denotes a propo-
sition; the light part of the circle is the proposition itself, while the dark part denotes
a negated proposition. Dashed lines represent the conditional obligations. Within Fig-
ure 1, the line from the light part of w to the dark part of o denotes (w,¬o). The box on
the left represents the context, in the example containing > and w.
The central notion of inference in normative systems is called detachment. For ex-
ample, in the Order Puzzle, the question is whether we can detach o, or we can de-
tach ¬o, or both. In the example, the formulas which can be derived from a normative
system are obligations. In general, permissions and institutional facts can also be de-
tached from normative systems, but we do not consider these aspects in this paper. A
detachment procedure defines the way deontic facts are derived from a normative sys-
tem. Different detachment procedures have been defined and studied in deontic logic,
as well as in other rule based systems. Moreover, even in hierarchical normative sys-
tems, not all conflicts may be resolved. In such a case, the detachment procedure may
derive several so-called extensions, each representing a set of obligations, permissions
and institutional facts.
In formalizing examples, one challenge in applied logic is that the representation
may be challenged. For example, it may be argued that the Colonel implies that if the
window is closed, then the heating should be turned off. However, in normative sys-
tems, such pragmatic considerations are usually not part of the detachment procedure
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[17], with only explicitly given norms and commands being considered. Any additional
interpretation or other pragmatic concerns are out of the scope of this paper.
Abstract normative systems [26] were introduced as a common core representation
for normative systems, which is still expressive enough to define the main detachment
procedures. In particular, analogous to the main input/output logics, they have factual
detachment built in, and have reasoning by cases, deontic detachment and identity as
optional inference patterns [3,17]. Such systems are called ‘abstract’, because negation
is the only logical connective that is defined in the language. Furthermore, Tosatto et
al. [26] considered elements and anti-elements rather than literals and propositions. It is
straightforward to define more connectives within such systems, and it is also possible
to define structured normative systems where the abstract elements are instantiated with
logical formulas, for example with formulas of a propositional or modal logic. The latter
more interesting representation of logical structure is analogous to the use of abstract
arguments in formal argumentation. An advantage of abstract normative systems over
structured ones is that the central inference of detachment can be visualized by walking
paths in the graph. In other words, inference is represented by graph reachability. For
example, node o is reachable from the context, and thus it can be detached. Moreover,
a conflict is represented by a node where both the light and the dark side are reachable
from the context, like node o in Figure 1.
There are several optional inference patterns for abstract normative systems, be-
cause, as is well known, most principles of deontic logic have been criticized for some
examples and applications. However, the absence of the same inference patterns is crit-
icized as well due to lack of explanations and predictions of the resulting detachment
procedures. Therefore, current approaches to represent and reason with normative sys-
tems, such as input/output logic as well as abstract normative systems, do not restrict
themselves to a single logic, but define a family of logics which can be embedded within
them. Deciding which logic to use in a specific context depends on the requirements of
the application. Similarly, with regards to permissions, there is an even larger diver-
sity of deontic logics [16] which adopt different representations. For each input/output
logic, various notions of permission have been defined, in terms of their relation to obli-
gation. We refer to the handbook of deontic logic and normative systems [12] for further
explanation, discussion and motivation.
Now let us consider how variants of detachment procedures might apply norms in
hierarchical normative systems in different orders, and result in different outcomes or
extensions. We examine three approaches describing well known procedures defined
in the literature, such as procedures defined in artificial intelligence [30,5,15]. How-
ever, our procedures have one important distinction: the context itself is not necessarily
part of the output. It is precisely this feature which distinguishes input/output logics
from traditional rule based languages like logic programming or default logic [24,6].
Such traditional rule based languages where the input is part of the output, are called
throughput operators in input/output logic research.
Greedy: The context contains propositions that are known to hold. This procedure
always applies the norm with the highest priority that does not introduce inconsistency
to an extension and the context. Here we say that a norm is applicable when its body
is in the context or has been produced by other norms and added to the extension. In
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this example, we begin with the context {w}, and (w,¬o) is first applied. Then (w, h)
is applied. Finally, (h, o) cannot be applied as this would result in a conflict, and so, by
using Greedy, we obtain the extension {h,¬o}.
Reduction: in this approach, a candidate extension is guessed. All norms that are
applicable according to this candidate extension are selected and transformed into un-
conditional or body-free norms. For example, a norm (a, b) selected in this way is trans-
formed to a norm (>, b). The modified hierarchical abstract normative system, with the
transformed norms is evaluated using Greedy. The candidate extension is selected as an
extension by Reduction if it is identified as an extension according to this application of
Greedy. Applied to our example, we select a candidate extension {h, o}, obtaining a set
of body-free norms {(>, h), (>,¬o), (>, o)}. The priorities assigned to these norms
are carried through from the original hierarchical abstract normative system, and are
therefore respectively 1, 2 and 3. After applying Greedy, we get an extension of Re-
duction: {h, o}. However, if we had selected the candidate extension {h,¬o}, this new
extension would not appear in Greedy as (>,¬o) has a lower priority than (>, o), and
the latter is therefore not an extension of Reduction.
Optimization: In terms of Hansen’s prioritized conditional imperatives, a set of max-
imally obeyable (i.e., minimally violated) norms is selected by choosing norms in order
of priority which are consistent with the context. Once these norms are selected, Greedy
is applied to identify the extension. In our example, the maximal set of obeyable norms
is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. Optimization therefore detaches the unique extension {¬o}.
We can also consider the example in terms of formal argumentation. Given a hier-
archical abstract normative system, we may construct an argumentation framework as
illustrated in Figure 2. An argumentation framework is a directed graph in which nodes
denote arguments, and edges denote attacks between arguments. In the setting of a hi-
erarchical abstract normative system, an argument is represented as a path within the
directed graph starting from a node in the context. In this example, there are four argu-
ments A0, A1, A2 and A3, represented as [w], [w, h], [w, h, o] and [w,¬o], respectively.
Since the conclusions of A2 and A3 are inconsistent, A2 attacks A3 and vice versa.
Priorities allow us to transform these attacks into defeats according to different prin-
ciples. While the last link principle ranks an argument based on the strength of its last
inference, the weakest link ranks an argument based on the strength of its weakest infer-
ence. In this example, if the last link principle is applied, then [w, h, o] defeats [w,¬o].
Furthermore, if the weakest link principle is used instead, [w,¬o] defeats [w, h, o]. As
a result, the former principle allows us to conclude {h, o}, while the latter concludes
{h,¬o}. In turn, the first result coincides with that obtained by Reduction, while the
second is the same as that obtained by Greedy.
Inspired by the example above, we wish to investigate the links between the three
detachment procedures for prioritized normative reasoning and argumentation theory.
More specifically, our main research question is as follows.
How can the three detachment procedures (Reduction, Greedy, and Optimiza-
tion) proposed in the context of abstract normative reasoning be represented in
formal argumentation?
To answer this research question, we propose a formal framework to connect hierar-
chical normative reasoning with argumentation theory. More precisely, our framework
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A0
[w] [w, h] [w, h, o] [w, ¬o]
A1 A2 A3
Fig. 2. The argumentation framework obtained from the Order puzzle hierarchical normative sys-
tem, with the four arguments and the attacks among them visualized as directed arrows.
represents the above-mentioned detachment procedures by lifting priorities from rules
to arguments, with the underlying goal of making as few commitments as possible to
specific argumentation systems. For this reason, we build on a structured argumenta-
tion framework which admits undercuts and rebuts between arguments, and allows for
priorities between norms making up arguments. We show that variants of approaches to
lifting priorities from rules to arguments allow us to capture both Greedy and Reduc-
tion, while the introduction of additional defeats capturing implicit conflicts between
arguments allows us to obtain Optimization.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 formalizes the above-mentioned
three detachment procedures of hierarchical normative reasoning (i.e., Greedy, Reduc-
tion, and Optimization). In Section 3, we introduce an argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system. Sections 4, 5 and 6 show how Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization can be represented in argumentation. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss
open problems and compare the proposed approach with related work, and in Section 8
we point out possible directions for future work.
2 Hierarchical abstract normative systems
In this section, we formally introduce the notion of hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem and three detachment procedures to compute what normative conclusions hold. A
hierarchical abstract normative system captures the context of a system and the norms in
force in such a system. There is an element in the universe called >, contained in every
context. In this paper, we consider only a finite universe. A hierarchical abstract norma-
tive system also encodes a ranking function over the norms to allow for the resolution
of conflicts.
Based on the notion of abstract normative system defined by Tosatto et al. [26], a
hierarchical abstract normative system can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Hierarchical abstract normative system). A hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system is a tupleH = 〈L,N,C, r〉, where
– L = E ∪ {¬e | e ∈ E} ∪ {>} is the universe, a set of literals based on some finite
set E of atomic elements;
– C ⊆ L is a subset of the universe, called a context, such that > ∈ C and for all e
in E, {e,¬e} 6⊆ C;
– N ⊆ L× L is a finite set of regulative norms;
– r : N → IN is a function from norms to natural numbers.
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Regulative (ordinary) norms are of the kind “if you turn on the heat, then you should
open the window”. These norms are conditional norms, requiring some condition to
hold (e.g., turning on the heat) before their conclusion can be drawn.
We write (a, x) for a regulative norm, where a, x ∈ L are the antecedent and con-
clusion of the norm, respectively. Given (a, x), we use r(a, x) to denote r((a, x)). Let
u, v ∈ N be two norms, we say that v is at least as preferred as u (denoted u ≤ v) if
and only if r(u) is not larger than r(v) (denoted r(u) ≤ r(v)), where r(u) is also called
the rank of u. We write u < v or v > u if and only if u ≤ v and v 6≤ u. Given a norm
u = (a, x) or 〈a, x〉, we write ant(u) for a to represent the antecedent of the norm, and
cons(u) for x to represent the consequent of the norm. Given a set of norms S ⊆ N ,
we use cons(S) to denote {cons(u) | u ∈ S}. We say that a hierarchical abstract nor-
mative system is totally ordered if and only if the ordering ≤ over N is antisymmetric,
transitive and total. Due to the finiteness of universe, the set of norms is finite. Note that
given this assumption, the notion of total ordering here is identical to that of the full
prioritization in Brewka and Eiter’s [7] and Hansen’s [14] work, and of the linearized
ordering of Young et al. [30]. For a ∈ L, we write a = ¬a if and only if a ∈ E, and
a = e for e ∈ E if and only if a = ¬e. For a set S ⊂ L, we say that a set S ⊆ L is
consistent if and only if there exist no e1, e2 ∈ S such that e1 = e2.
Example 1 (Order puzzle). In terms of Definition 1, the set of norms and priorities
that are visualized in Figure 1 can be formally represented as a hierarchical abstract
normative system H1 = 〈L,N , C, r〉, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N =
{(w, h), (h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(h, o) = 3, r(w,¬o) = 2.
In the hierarchical abstract normative system setting, the three detachment proce-
dures for prioritized normative reasoning can be defined as follows.
First, Greedy detachment for a hierarchical abstract normative system always ap-
plies the norm with the highest priority among those which can be applied, if this does
not bring inconsistency to the extension and the context. So, we have the following
definitions.
Definition 2 (Paths). Let H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem. For all R ⊆ N , a path in H from x1 to xn with respect to R is a sequence of
norms (x1, x2), . . . (xn−1, xn) such that {(x1, x2), . . . , (xn−1, xn)} ⊆ R, n ≥ 2, and
all norms of the sequence are distinct.
Definition 3 (Greedy). LetH = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system. For all R ⊆ N , let R(C) = {x | there is a path in H from an
element in C to x with respect to R}, and Appl(N,C,R) := {(a, x) ∈ N | a ∈ C ∪
cons(R), x, x /∈ C ∪ cons(R)}. The extension of H by Greedy, written as Greedy(H),
is the set R(C) such that R = ∪∞i=0Ri is built inductively as:
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 = Ri ∪max(N,C,Ri, r)
where max(N,C,Ri, r) = {u ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) | ∀v ∈ Appl(N,C,Ri) : r(u) ≥
r(v)}.
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a b c
T 1
2
3
4 1: (a,b)
2: (a,¬b)
3: (b,c)
4: (c,b)
Fig. 3. The hierarchical abstract normative system of Example 3 containing the two Reduction
extensions {b, c} and {¬b}.
Example 2 (Extensions by Greedy). Given H1 in Example 1, by Greedy, it holds that
R0 = ∅, R1 = {(w,¬o)}, R2 = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}, R = {(w,¬o), (w, h)}. So,
Greedy(H1) = {h,¬o}.
Based on Greedy, Reduction and Optimization are defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Reduction). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative sys-
temH = 〈L,N ,C, r〉, and a setX , letHX=〈L,N ′,C, r′〉, whereN ′ = max{r(l1, l2) |
(l1, l2) ∈ N ; l1 ∈ C ∪X} and r′(>, l2) = r(l1, l2) for all (l1, l2) ∈ N are priorities
over norms. An extension ofH by Reduction is a set U such that U is Greedy(HU ). The
set of extensions ofH by Reduction is denoted as Reduction(H).
Example 3 (Extensions by Reduction). Consider againH1 in Example 1. By using Re-
duction, givenX = {h, o}, we haveHX1 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉, whereN ′ = {(>, h), (>, o),
(>,¬o)}, r′(>, h) = 1, r′(>, o) = 3 and r′(>,¬o) = 2. Since X ∈ Greedy(HX1 ),
and no other set can be an extension, we have that Reduction(H1) = {{h, o}}.
Given the hierarchical abstract normative system in Figure 3, assume that we have
a context C = {a}. We then consider X1 = {b, c} and X2 = {¬b}. In the first case,
we haveHX1 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where N ′ = {(>, b), (>,¬b), (>, c)} and r′(>, b) = 4,
r′(>, c) = 3, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Here, Greedy(HX1) = {b, c} i.e., X1.
In the second case, we obtainHX2 = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where N ′ = {(>, b), (>,¬b)}
and r′(>, b) = 1, r′(>,¬b) = 2. Now, Greedy(HX2) = {¬b}, i.e., X2. In this case,
we therefore obtain two extensions using Reduction.
Definition 5 (Optimization). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative
systemH = 〈L,N , C, r〉, let T = {u1, u2, . . . , un} be the linear order on N such that
u1 > u2 > · · · > un. We define a set R as R = Rn such that:
R0 = ∅
Ri+1 =
{
Ri ∪ {ui}, if cons(C ∪Ri ∪ {ui}) is consistent
Ri, else
An extension by Optimization is a set O = R(C). The set of extensions of H by Opti-
mization is denoted as Optimization(H).
Example 4 (Extensions by Optimization). Regarding H1 in Example 1, by Optimiza-
tion, let u1 = (h, o), u2 = (w, ¬o), and u3 = (w, h), and T = {u1, u2, u3}. Then, it
holds that R0 = ∅, R1 = {u1}, R2 = {u1, u2}, and R = R3 = R2 = {u1, u2}. So,
we obtain that Optimization(H1) = {{¬o}}.
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3 Argumentation theory for a hierarchical abstract normative
system
In this section, we introduce an argumentation theory on prioritized norms. Given a
hierarchical abstract normative system, we first define arguments and defeats between
them, then compute extensions of arguments in terms of Dung’s theory [10], and from
these, obtain conclusions.
3.1 Arguments
In a hierarchical abstract normative system, an argument is an acyclic path in the graph
starting in an element of the context. We assume minimal arguments—no norm can be
applied twice in an argument and no redundant norm is included in an argument. We
use concl(α) to denote the conclusion of an argument α, and concl(E) = {concl(α) |
α ∈ E} for the conclusions of a set of arguments E.
Definition 6 (Arguments and sub-arguments). Let H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchi-
cal abstract normative system.
A context argument inH is an element a ∈ C, and its conclusion is concl(a) = a.
An ordinary argument is a path α inH from u1 to un, n ≥ 1, such that:
1. ant(u1) ∈ C; and
2. {ant(u1), . . . , ant(un), cons(un)} is consistent.
Moreover, we have that concl(α) = cons(un).
The sub-arguments of argument [u1, . . . , un] are, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, [u1, . . . , ui]. Note
that context arguments do not have sub-arguments.
The set of all arguments constructed from H is denoted as Arg(H). For readability,
[(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)] may be written as (a1, a2, . . . , an−1, an). The set of sub-
arguments of an argument α is denoted as sub(α).
3.2 Defeat relation between arguments
We follow the tradition in much of preference-based argumentation [2,21], where at-
tack captures a relation among arguments which ignores preferences, and defeat is a
preference-aware relation on which the semantics is based. To define the defeat relation
among prioritized arguments, we assume that only the priorities of the norms are used
to compare arguments. In other words, we assume a lifting of the ordering on norms to
a binary relation on sequences of norms (i.e., arguments), written as α  β, where α
and β are two arguments, indicating that α is at least as preferred as β.
There is no common agreement about the best way to lift≥ to. In argumentation,
there are at least two ways to introduce weights. As an argumentation framework con-
sists of a set of arguments and an attack relation between them, we can either assign
the weights to the arguments, or we can assign the weights to the attacks. Traditionally,
weights are assigned to arguments. Two common approaches to give the strength of an
argument are the weakest link and the last link principles, combined with the elitist and
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democratic ordering [21]. For example, in the weakest link principle the weight of the
argument is the weight of the weakest rule used in the argument. However, Young et
al. [30] showed that elitist weakest link cannot be used to calculate  for Greedy, and
proposes a disjoint elitist order which ignores shared rules. It is worth noticing that the
strength of an argument may depend on the argument it is attacking, as identified by
Young et al. [30]. Based on this idea, we define the orderings between arguments by
assigning a strength to the attacks between the arguments, to reflect the priority of the
norms used in the arguments, following the same insights of the weakest link and last
link principles (denoted as w and l respectively). By taking the way of defining the
weakest link ordering from [30], we have the following definition:
Definition 7 (Weakest link and last link). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system, and α = [u1, . . . , un] and β = [v1, . . . , vm] be two argu-
ments in Arg(H). Let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un} and Φ2 = {v1, . . . , vm}. By the weakest link
principle, α w β iff ∃v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1 s.t. ∀u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2, v ≤ u. By the last link principle,
α l β iff un ≥ vm.
When the context is clear, we write  for w, or l. We write α  β for α  β
without β  α.
Proposition 1 (Transitivity). It holds that the relations w and l are transitive.
Proof. Let α = [u1, . . . , un], β = [v1, . . . , vm] and γ = [w1, . . . , wk] be three ar-
guments in Arg(H). For the case of the weakest link, let Φ1 = {u1, . . . , un}, Φ2 =
{v1, . . . , vm}, and Φ3 = {w1, . . . , wk}, n,m, k ≥ 1. Let x12 ∈ Φ1∩Φ2, x13 ∈ Φ1∩Φ3,
and x23 ∈ Φ2∪Φ3, x1 ∈ Φ1 \(Φ2∪Φ3), x2 ∈ Φ2 \(Φ1∪Φ3), and x3 ∈ Φ3 \(Φ1∪Φ2).
Assume that α w β and β w γ. There are only the following four possible cases.
Case 1: There exists x23 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x23 ≤ x13 and x23 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. It follows that
x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1. Since x23 ∈ Φ3, it means that there exists x23 ∈ Φ3 such that
x23 ≤ x12 and x23 ≤ x1 where x12, x1 ∈ Φ1. Hence, α w γ.
Case 2: There exist x23 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈ Φ2:
x23 ≤ x13, x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, there are in turn only the
following two possible sub-cases: either x23 ≤ x3 or x23 > x3. If x23 ≤ x3, since
x3 ≤ x12, it holds that x23 ≤ x12. Since x23 ≤ x1 and x23 ≤ x12, it holds that
α w γ. Second, if x23 > x3, since x23 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x1. Since x3 ≤ x12 and x3 ≤ x1,
α w γ.
Case 3: There exists x2 ∈ Φ2, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, x2 ≤ x13 and x2 ≤ x1; and
since x13 ∈ Φ3, assume that for all x12, x2 ∈ Φ2, x13 ≤ x12, x13 ≤ x2. In this case,
there are in turn only the following two possible sub-cases: x23 ≤ x13 or x3 ≤ x13,
or x23 > x13 and x3 > x13. If x23 ≤ x13 and x3 ≤ x13, it holds that α w γ. If
x23 > x13 and x3 > x13, it holds that x13 < x23 and x13 ≤ x2, and therefore β w α.
Contradiction.
Case 4: There exist x2 ∈ Φ2 and x3 ∈ Φ3, for all x13, x1 ∈ Φ1, and x12, x2 ∈ Φ2:
x2 ≤ x13, x2 ≤ x1, x3 ≤ x12, x3 ≤ x2. In this case, since x3 ≤ x12 and x3 ≤ x1, it
holds that α w γ.
For last link, it is obvious that l is transitive.
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Given a way to lift the ordering on norms to an ordering on arguments, the notion
of defeat can be defined as follows.
Definition 8 (Defeat among arguments). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical
abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ Arg(H),
α attacks β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
1. concl(α) = concl(β′)
α defeats β iff β has a sub-argument β′ such that
1. concl(α) = concl(β′) and
2. α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and β′ 6 α.
The set of defeats between the arguments in Arg(H) based on a preference ordering
 is denoted as Def(H,).
In what follows, an argument α = [u1, . . . , un] with ranking on norms is denoted
as u1 . . . un : r(α), where r(α) = (r(u1), . . . , r(un)).
Example 5 (Order puzzle continued). Consider the hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem in Example 1. We have the following arguments (visually presented in Figure 2):
A0 : w (context argument)
A1 : (w, h) : (1) (ordinary argument)
A2 : (w, h)(h, o) : (1, 3) (ordinary argument)
A3 : (w,¬o) : (2) (ordinary argument)
We have that A2 attacks A3 and vice versa, and there are no other attacks among the
arguments. Moreover, A2 defeats A3 if (2) 6 (1, 3) (last link), and A3 defeats A2 if
(1, 3) 6 (2) (weakest link).
3.3 Argument extensions and conclusion extensions
Given a set of arguments A = Arg(H) and a set of defeats R = Def(H,), we get an
argumentation framework (AF) F = (A,R).
Following the seminal work of abstract argumentation by Dung [10], we say that a
setB ⊆ A is admissible, if and only if it is conflict-free and it can defend each argument
within the set. A set B ⊆ A is conflict-free if and only if there exist no arguments α
and β in B such that (α, β) ∈ R. Argument α ∈ A is defended by a set B ⊆ A (in
such a situation α can also be said to be acceptable with respect to B) if and only if for
all β ∈ A, if (β, α) ∈ R, then there exists γ ∈ B such that (γ, β) ∈ R. Based on the
notion of admissible sets, some other extensions can be defined. Formally, we have the
following.
Definition 9 (Conflict-freeness, defense and extensions). Let F = (A,R) be an ar-
gumentation framework, and B ⊆ A a set of arguments.
– B is conflict-free if and only if @α, β ∈ B, s.t. (α, β) ∈ R.
– An argument α ∈ A is defended by B (equivalently α is acceptable w.r.t. B), if and
only if ∀(β, α) ∈ R, ∃γ ∈ B, s.t. (γ, β) ∈ R.
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– B is admissible if and only ifB is conflict-free, and each argument inB is defended
by B.
– B is a complete extension if and only if B is admissible and each argument in A
that is defended by B is in B.
– B is a preferred extension if and only if B is a maximal (w.r.t. set-inclusion) com-
plete extension.
– B is a grounded extension if and only if B is the minimal (w.r.t. set-inclusion)
complete extension.
– B is a stable extension if and only if B is conflict-free, and ∀α ∈ A \ B, ∃β ∈ B
s.t. (β, α) ∈ R.
A semantics describes the set of extensions one is wishes to obtain. We use sem ∈
{cmp, prf, grd, stb} to denote the complete, preferred, grounded, and stable semantics,
respectively. A set of argument extensions of F = (A,R) is denoted as sem(F). We
write Outfamily for the set of conclusions from the extensions of the argumentation
theory, as in [28].
Definition 10 (Conclusion extensions). Given a hierarchical abstract normative sys-
tem H = 〈L,N,C, r〉, let F = (Arg(H),Def(H,)) be the AF constructed from H.
The conclusion extensions, written as Outfamily(F , sem), are the conclusions of the
ordinary arguments within argument extensions.
Outfamily(F , sem) = {{concl(α) | α ∈ S, α is an ordinary argument} | S ∈ sem(F)}
Multi-extension semantics can yield different conclusions when norms may yield
multiple most preferred results.
Example 6 (Order puzzle in argumentation). According to Example 5, letA = {A0, . . . ,
A3}. We have F1 = (A, {(A2, A3)}) where A2 l A3, and F2 = (A, {(A3, A2)})
where A3 w A2. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, Outfamily(F1, sem) = {{h, o}},
and Outfamily(F2, sem) = {{h,¬o}}.
We now turn our attention to the properties of the argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system.
First, according to Definition 8, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Sub-argument attack and defeat). Let F = (A,R) be an AF con-
structed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all α, β ∈ A, if α attacks
β, then α attacks arguments that have β as a sub-argument; if α defeats β, α defeats
arguments that have β as a sub-argument.
Proof. When α attacks β, according to Definition 8, β has a sub-argument β′ such that
concl(α) = concl(β′). Let γ be an argument that has β as a sub-argument. It follows
that β′ is a sub-argument of γ. Hence, α attacks γ.
When α defeats β, according to Definition 8, β has a sub-argument β′ such that
concl(α) = concl(β′) and α is a context argument; or α is an ordinary argument and
β′ 6 α, Since β′ is a sub-argument of γ, α defeats γ.
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Second, corresponding to properties of sub-argument closure and direct consistency
in ASPIC+ [21], we have the following two properties.
Proposition 3 (Closure under sub-arguments). Let F = (A,R) be an AF con-
structed from a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb},
∀E ∈ sem(F), if an argument α ∈ E, then sub(α) ⊆ E.
Proof. For every β ∈ sub(α), since α is acceptable with respect to E, it holds that β
is acceptable with respect to E. This is because for each γ ∈ R, if γ defeats β, then
according to Proposition 2, γ defeats α; since α ∈ E, there exists an η ∈ E such that η
defeats γ. Given that β is acceptable with respect to E and E is a complete extension,
it holds that β ∈ E.
Since all norms in a hierarchical abstract normative system are defeasible, we only
need to discuss direct consistency.
Proposition 4 (Direct consistency). Let F = (A,R) be an AF constructed from
a hierarchical abstract normative system. For all sem ∈ {cmp, prf, grd, stb}, ∀E ∈
sem(F), {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an ordinary argument} is consistent.
Proof. Assume that there exist α, β ∈ E such that concl(α) = concl(β). Since both α
and β are ordinary arguments, α attacks β, and β attacks α. If α  β then α defeats β.
Otherwise, β defeats α. In both cases, E is not conflict-free, contradicting the fact that
E is a complete extension.
In the next sections, we present representation results for the Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization approaches introduced in Section 2, identifying equivalences between
these approaches, and an argument semantics based description of a hierarchical ab-
stract normative system.
4 Representation results for Greedy
For a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system without permissive norms,
we have the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Greedy is weakest link). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation frame-
work F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), it holds that F is acyclic, and {Greedy(H)} =
Outfamily(F , grd).
Proof. First, sinceH is totally ordered, underw, the relationw among arguments is
acyclic. Assume the contrary. Then, there exist three distinct α, β, γ ∈ Arg(H) such that
α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Definition 7, when H is totally ordered,
it holds that α w β, β w γ and γ w α. According to Proposition 1, α w γ,
contradicting γ w α. Hence, F is acyclic, and therefore has a unique extension under
all argumentation semantics mentioned above.
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Second, let G = Greedy(H) be the unique extension of H, and E = {(a1, . . . ,
an) ∈ Arg(H) | {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ G ∪ C}. According to Definition 3, it holds that
G = {concl(α) | α ∈ E}. Now, we verify that E is a stable extension of F:
(1) Since all premises and the conclusion of each argument of E are contained in
G ∪ C which is conflict-free, it holds that E is conflict-free.
(2) ∀β = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Arg(H) \ E, bm /∈ G (otherwise, if bm ∈ G, then
{b1, . . . , bm−1} ⊆ G ∪ C, and thus β ∈ E, contradicting β /∈ E). Then there exist
α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E and j ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m}, such that {a1, . . . , an, b1, . . . , bj} is a
minimal inconsistent set, and an = bj . Then, we have the following two possible cases:
1. (an−1, an) and (bj−1, bj) are applicable at the same time: in this case, since
an ∈ G, r(an−1, an) ≥ r(bj−1, bj). Let Φ1 = {(a1, a2), . . . , (an−1, an)} and
Φ2 = {(b1, b2), . . . , (bj−1, bj)}. It follows that (a1, . . . , an) w (b1, . . . , bj). This
is because it is not the case that ∃u ∈ Φ1 \ Φ2 such that ∀v ∈ Φ2 \ Φ1, v > u.
Otherwise, u is not applicable until all norms in Φ2 have been applied. As a result,
(an−1, an) is not applicable before (bj−1, bj) has been applied, contradicting the
assumption that (an−1, an) and (bj−1, bj) are applicable at the same time. Since
(a1, . . . , an)w (b1, . . . , bj), it holds that (a1, . . . , an)w (b1, . . . , bj , bj+1, bm).
So, β is defeated by α.
2. (an−1, an) is applicable and (bj−1, bj) is not applicable. In this case, there are two
possibilities:
– (a1, . . . , an) w (b1, . . . , bj): β is defeated by α.
– (b1, . . . , bj) w (a1, . . . , an): in this case, ∃γ = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ E s.t.: ck =
bi, (c1, . . . , ck) w (b1, . . . , bi), 2 ≤ i < j. Then, β is defeated by γ.
Since E is conflict-free and for all β ∈ Arg(H) \ E, β is defeated by an argument
in E, E is a stable extension. Finally, since F is acyclic, the stable and grounded
extensions are equivalent, and therefore {Greedy(H)} = Outfamily(F , grd).
Note that Proposition 5 corresponds to Theorem 5.3 of Young et al. 2016 [30]. This
correspondence arises as follows. First, in the argumentation theory for a hierarchical
abstract normative system, we use disjoint elitist order to compare sets of norms, while
in the argumentation theory for prioritized default logic, Young et al. use a new order
called a structure-preference order, which takes into account the structure of how argu-
ments are constructed. Since in the setting of hierarchical abstract normative systems,
arguments are acyclic paths, it is not necessary to use the structure-preference order to
compare arguments. Second, due to the different ways of constructing argumentation
frameworks, the proof of Proposition 5 differs from that of Theorem 5.3 of Young et
al. 2016 [30]. The former considers the order of the applicability of norms in the proof,
while the latter uses the mechanism defined in the structure-preference order.
5 Representation result for Reduction
According to Brewka and Eiter [7], Reduction is based on the following two points.
1) The application of a rule with nonmonotonic assumptions means jumping to a con-
clusion. This conclusion is yet another assumption which has to be used globally in
the program for the issue of deciding whether a rule is applicable or not.
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2) The rules must be applied in an order compatible with the priority information.
This global view of deciding whether a rule is applicable coincides with the last-
link principle of lifting a preference relation between rules to a priority relation between
resulting arguments. According to Definition 4 and the argumentation theory for a hier-
archical abstract normative system, we have the following representation result.
Proposition 6 (Reduction is last link). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,l)), it holds that Reduction(H) = Outfamily(F , stb).
Proof. (⇒:) Given every H ∈ Reduction(H), let E = {(a1, . . . , an) ∈ Arg(H) |
{a1, . . . , an} ⊆ H ∪ C}. According to Reduction, H = {concl(α) | α ∈ E,α is an
ordinary argument}, because ∀a ∈ H , there exists at least one argument (a1, . . . , an)
s.t. an = a and {a1, . . . , an−1} ⊆ H ∪ C, which is in turn because if an ∈ H , then
(an−1, an) is applicable w.r.t. H ∪ C, and hence an−1 ∈ H ∪ C; recursively, we have
ai ∈ H ∪ C for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}.
Let (Args0,Defeats0) be an argumentation framework, in which Args0 = {α ∈
Arg(H) | sub(α) \ {α} ⊆ E}, Defeats0 ⊆ Args0 × Args0 that is constructed in terms
of the last link principle. It holds that Defeats0 ⊆ Def(H,l). For all α ∈ Args0 \ E,
concl(α) /∈ H . Then, ∃β ∈ E s.t. concl(α) = concl(β) and β defeats α by using the
last link principle. It follows that E is a stable extension of (Args0,Defeats0). Now, let
us prove that E is a stable extension of F .
We need only to verify that for all α ∈ Arg(H) \ Args0, α is defeated by E. It
follows that α has at least one sub-argument (otherwise, it should be included in E,
contradicting α /∈ Args0). Let β be a sub-argument of α and let β have no proper sub-
argument, i.e., sub(β) = {β}. It follows that β is in Args0. Then we have the following
two possible cases:
– β is defeated by E: In this case, α is defeated by E.
– β is not defeated by E: In this case, β is in E (since E is a stable extension). Then,
according to the definition of Args0, the direct super argument of β (say β
′) is in
Args0. In turn, we have two possible cases similar to the cases w.r.t. β. Recursively,
we may conclude that α is defeated by E or, α is in E (this case does not exist).
(⇐:) Given every E ∈ stb(F), let H′ = 〈L,N ′, C, r′〉 where N ′ = {(>, b) | (a, b) ∈
N and a ∈ concl(E)}, and r′(>, b) = r(a, b) for all (a, b) ∈ N and a ∈ concl(E).
Let E′ = {(>, an) | (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E}.
In order to prove that concl(E) is an extension ofH in term of Reduction, according
to Proposition 5, we only need to verify that E′ is a stable extension of (Arg(H′),
Def(H′,′w)) which is an argumentation framework of H′ by using the weakest link
principle. This is true, because:
– Since E is conflict-free, E′ is conflict-free.
– For all β′ ∈ Arg(H′) \ E′, let β be a corresponding argument in Arg(H) \ E s.t.
β = (b1, . . . , bn), β′ = (>, bn), and all sub-arguments of β are inE. Since β is not
in E, it is defeated by E. Since all sub-arguments of β are not defeated by E, there
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A4
[(a,b),(b,c),(c,b)]
A1
[(a,b)]
A2
[(a, ¬b)]
A3
[(a,b),(b,c)]
A0
[a]
Fig. 4. The argumentation framework obtained for the hierarchical abstract normative system of
Figure 3.
A4
[(r,z)]
A1 [r]
A2
[p]
A3
[(b,c)]
A0
[b]
A8A7
A6 A5
[(p, ¬d)][(b,c),(c,d)]
[(r,z),(z,¬c)] [(p, ¬d),[(¬d,¬z)]]
Fig. 5. An argumentation framework with no stable extension.
exists an argument inE whose conclusion is in conflict with concl(β) = concl(β′).
So, β′ is defeated by E′.
Example 7 (Order puzzle, Reduction). Consider Example 6 when the last link principle
is applied, A2 defeats A3. Then, we have Outfamily(F1, stb) = {{h, o}}, which is
equal to Reduction(H1).
Example 8 (Multiple extensions). Consider the hierarchical abstract normative system
of Figure 3 when the last link principle is applied. We obtain the argumentation frame-
work shown in Figure 4, written as F3, yielding Outfamily(F3, stb) = {{b, c}, {¬b}}.
Note that here, we have two distinct stable extensions.
Since stable extensions do not necessarily exist for all argumentation frameworks,
the Reduction of a hierarchical abstract normative system might not exist.
Example 9 (Empty Reduction). Consider the hierarchical abstract normative system
H = 〈L,N,C, r〉 where N = {(c, d), (p,¬d), (z,¬c), (¬d,¬z), (r, z), (b, c)}, C =
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{b, r, p} and r(c, d) = 5, r(p,¬d) = 4, r(z,¬c) = 6, r(¬d,¬z) = 2, r(r, z) = 1 and
r(b, c) = 0. When the last link principle is applied, this hierarchical abstract normative
system yields the argumentation framework shown in Figure 5, which has no stable
extension.
6 Representation result for Optimization
Intuitively, Optimization involves adding the highest priority norms which are consis-
tent with the context, until no more norms can be added, obtaining a maximal set of
obeyable norms, following which conclusions can be computed. For the norms that do
not belong to the maximal obeyable set, in the context of argumentation, the arguments
represented by these norms should be defeated. For instance, as illustrated in Figure
1, the maximal obeyable set of norms is {(h, o), (w,¬o)}. The norm (w, h) does no
belong to this set. In order to prevent the conclusion h from being drawn, we need some
way to defeat the corresponding argument [(w, h)].
Note that the argument [(w, h)] has an implicit conflict with the argument [(w,¬o)],
since if [(w, h)] is accepted, then its superargument [(w, h), (h, o)] is in conflict with
[(w,¬o)]. Since [(w, h), (h, o)] is defeated by [(w,¬o)] by applying the weakest link
principle, corresponding to the detachment procedure of Optimization, [(w, h)] has to
be defeated by [(w,¬o)]. Inspired by this idea, we introduce an approach that involves
adding auxiliary defeats to the corresponding argumentation framework of an abstract
hierarchical normative system. Thus, while the argument A1 = [(w, h)] is not directly
defeated by A3 = [(w,¬o)], since the former contains the weakest link of the argument
A2 = [(w, h), (h, o)], we introduce an auxiliary defeat from A3 to A1, in addition to
the already present defeat from A3 to A2. Given an argument α, each subargument of
α containing the weakest link is called a weakest subargument of α.
Definition 11 (Weakest subargument). Given a totally ordered hierarchical abstract
normative system H = 〈L, N,C, r〉 and the corresponding argumentation framework
F = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)), for all α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ Arg(H), if (ai, ai+1) is the
weakest link, then every subargument of α containing (ai, ai+1) is a weakest subargu-
ment.
When a weakest subargument of α is defeated by an argument β, all superarguments
of the weakest subargument are also defeated by β. A weakest subargument of α or a
superargument of this weakest subargument is called a weakest argument of α. The set
of weakest arguments of α is denoted as wks(α).
Building on this concept, an expanded argumentation framework of F with auxil-
iary defeats on weakest arguments is defined as follows.
Definition 12 (Expanded argumentation framework with additional defeats on weak-
est arguments). Given an argumentation framework F = (Arg(H),Def(H,w)) that
is constructed from a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system H = 〈L,
N,C, r〉, the expanded argumentation framework of F with auxiliary defeats on weak-
est arguments is F ′ = (Arg(H), Def(H,w)′) where Def(H,w)′ = Def(H,w) ∪
{(α, γ) | γ ∈ wks(β), (α, β) ∈ Def(H,w)}.
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Example 10 (Prioritized triangle, continued). Consider the argumentation framework
in Figure 2, when applying the weakest link principle, A3 defeats A2. Since the set of
weakest subarguments of A2 is {A1}, A3 defeats A1.
The following proposition shows that Optimization can be represented in formal
argumentation by the weakest link together with adding auxiliary defeats on weakest
arguments to an argumentation framework.
Proposition 7 (Optimization is weakest link plus auxiliary defeats). Let H = 〈L,
N,C, r〉 be a totally ordered hierarchical abstract normative system, andF ′ = (Arg(H),
Def(H,w)′) be an argumentation framework ofH with additional defeats on weakest
subarguments. It holds that Optimization(H) = Outfamily(F ′, prf).
Proof. First, it holds that Def(H,w)′ is acyclic for different arguments in the sense
that for all α, β ∈ Arg(H), if α 6= β, then if α defeats β, then there is no path from
β to α with respect to Def(H,w)′. This is because, Def(H,w) is acyclic, and each
auxiliary defeat is from an attacker who has higher priority to a weakest subargument
of the attackee who has lower priority. Hence, F ′ has a unique extension.
Second, let O = Optimization(H) be the unique extension of H, and E = {(a1,
. . . , an) ∈ Arg(O) | {a1, . . . , an} ⊆ O ∪ C}. According to Definition 5, it holds that
O = {concl(α) | α ∈ E}. Now, we verify that E is a preferred extension of F ′:
(1) Since all premises and the conclusion of each argument of E are contained in
O ∪ C which is conflict-free, it holds that E is conflict-free.
(2) For each α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E and for each β = (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Arg(H) \ E,
if β defeats α, then there exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that bm = ai. In this case, there exists
γ = (c1, . . . , ck) ∈ E, k ≥ 1, and 1 ≤ j ≤ m, such that ck = bj and γ defeats β.
(3) Assume that there exists E′ ⊃ E such that E′ is a preferred extension of F ′.
Then, for each α = (a1, . . . , an) ∈ E′, an ∈ H, contradicting α /∈ E.
Given thatE is a maximal admissible set, it turns out thatE is a preferred extension.
A0
[w]
A3
[(w,h),(h,o)]
A1
[(w,h)]
A4
[(w,¬h),(¬h,o)]
A2
[(w,¬h)]
A5
[(w,¬o)]
Fig. 6. Argument framework extended with auxiliary defeats (denoted using dashed lines).
Example 11 (Order puzzle, Optimization). LetH′1 = 〈L,N,C, r〉 be a hierarchical ab-
stract normative system, where L = {w, h, o,¬w,¬h,¬o,>}, N = {(w, h), (w,¬h),
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(h, o), (¬h, o), (w,¬o)}, C = {w,>}, r(w, h) = 1, r(w,¬h) = 0, r(h, o) = 3,
r(¬h, o) = 4, r(w,¬o) = 2. Here,R3 = {(¬h, o), (h, o), (w,¬o)} and soOptimization(H′1) =
{¬o}. Figure 6 illustrates the argument framework obtained from this hierarchical ab-
stract normative system. Again, auxiliary defeats are shown as dashed lines. Here,
Outfamily(H′1 , prf ) = {{¬o}}.
A0
[a]
A1 A2
A3
[(a,b)] [(a,b),(b,c)]
[(a,b),(b,¬c)]
Fig. 7. Argument framework extended with auxiliary defeats (denoted using dashed lines).
Example 12 (Empty Optimization). Let H = 〈L,N , C, r〉 be a hierarchical abstract
normative system, where L = {a, b, c,¬a,¬b,¬c,>}, N = {(a, b), (b, c), (b,¬c)},
C = {a,>}, r(a, b) = 1, r(b, c) = 2, r(b,¬c) = 3. Evaluating this system us-
ing Optimization, R2 = {(b, c), (b,¬c)}, and Optimization(H) = ∅. Figure 7 il-
lustrates the resulting argument framework. Arguments containing (a, b) are weakest
arguments, and dashed lines represent the auxiliary defeats generated against these
arguments. Since this framework has one preferred extension which is an empty set,
Outfamily(H, prf ) = ∅.
7 Discussions and Related work
The role of examples in the study of logic has a long and rich history. Traditionally, a
logic was proposed to model some example problem, following which examples were
introduced to highlight paradoxes or inconsistencies in the logic, whereupon a new
logic — addressing these problems — was proposed, and the cycle repeated. While
this approach has significantly enriched the field, it is not without its problems. For
example, there is still a debate regarding deontic detachment5 (deriving an obligation
from another obligation) within the community, as in some cases, deontic detachment
intuitively holds, and in other cases it does not [23]. Given this, we do not seek to claim
that the logic we present in this paper is in any sense the “right” logic. Instead, our goal
is to answer the following questions.
5 We note in passing that deontic detachment occurs in the logics we consider, but can be dis-
abled through the introduction of higher priority norms, or relevant contextual information.
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1. What are the general properties of systems considered relevant to some problem?
2. Given an application, what choices should be made in order to obain a solution?
In this work, the systems we considered are three different logics, encoded in the
general framework of hierarchical abstract normative systems. The property we consid-
ered is then the conclusions that one can draw from each of the logics (in the context of
prioritized norms), which we describe in the context of an argumentation system.
Our results then characterize the outputs of Greedy, Reduction and Optimization in
terms of argumentation, allowing one to decide which approach is relevant to their needs
by understanding the effects of each approach through the argumentation literature. The
semantics associated with each approach also shed light on the complexity of computing
conclusions in the normative context.
Regarding related work, Young et al. [30] endowed Brewka’s prioritized default
logic (PDL) with argumentation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for structured
argumentation [22]. More precisely, their goal is to define a preference ordering over
arguments %, based on the strict total order over defeasible rules defined to instantiate
ASPIC+ to PDL, so as to ensure that an extension within PDL corresponds to the jus-
tified conclusions of its ASPIC+ instantiation. Several options are investigated, and
they demonstrate that the standard ASPIC+ elitist ordering cannot be used to calcu-
late % as there is no correspondence between the argumentation-defined inferences and
PDL, and the same holds for a disjoint elitist preference ordering. The authors come
up with a new argument preference ordering definition which captures both preferences
over arguments and also when defeasible rules become applicable in the arguments’
construction, leading to the definition of a strict total order on defeasible rules and
corresponding non-strict arguments. Their representation theorem shows that a corre-
spondence always exists between the inferences made in PDL and the conclusions of
justified arguments in the ASPIC+ instantiation under stable semantics.
Brewka and Eiter [7] consider programs supplied with priority information, which
is given by a supplementary strict partial ordering of the rules. This additional informa-
tion is used to solve potential conflicts. Moreover, their idea is that conclusions should
be only those literals that are contained in at least one answer set. They propose to
use preferences on rules for selecting a subset of the answer sets, called the preferred
answer sets. In their approach, a rule is applied unless it is defeated via its assump-
tions by rules of higher priorities. Our definition (Def. 4) and the original formalism of
Brewka and Eiter [7] are different, in the sense that in our definition we do not make
use of default negation to represent the exceptions, i.e., the defeasibility, of a (strict)
rule. Rather, we use defeasible rules and the notion of the applicability of such rules.
This means that the correct translation of the Order Puzzle of Example 1 ends up with
the following logic program6:
r0 : w.
r1 : h : - not ¬h, w.
r2 : ¬o : - not o, w.
r3 : o : - not ¬o, h.
6 Note that in [7] r0 < r3 means that r0 has higher priority than r3.
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r0 < r3 < r2 < r1
If preferences are disregarded, then this logic program has two answer sets: {w, h,¬o}
and {w, h, o}. Thus, considering preferences, the latter is the unique preferred answer
set. After dropping the contextw from the answer set, we get an extension {h, o}, which
is identical to the result obtained in Example 3.
Dung [11] presents an approach to deal with contradictory conclusions in defeasible
reasoning with priorities. More precisely, he starts from the observation that often, the
proposed approaches to defeasible reasoning with priorities (e.g., [5,25,21]) sanction
contradictory conclusions, as exemplified byASPIC+ using the weakest link principle
together with the elitist ordering which returns contradictory conclusions with respect
to its other three attack relations, and the conclusions reached with the well known
approach of Brewka and Eiter [7]. Dung shows then that the semantics for any complex
interpretation of default preferences can be characterized by a subset of the set of stable
extensions with respect to the normal attack relation assignments, i.e., a normal form
for ordinary attack relation assignments. Dung’s normal attack relation satisfies some
desirable properties (Credulous cumulativity and Attack monotonicity) that cannot be
satisfied by the ASPIC+ semantics [11], i.e., the semantics of structured argumentation
with respect to a given ordering of structured arguments (elitist or democratic pre-order)
in ASPIC+. In the setting of this paper, this notion could be defined as follows. Let
α = (a1, . . . , an) and β = (b1, . . . , bm) be arguments constructed from a hierarchical
abstract normative system. Since we have no Pollock style undercutting argument (as
in ASPIC+) and each norm is assumed to be defeasible, α is said to normally attack
argument β if and only if β has a sub-argument β′ such that concl(α) = concl(β′), and
r((an−1, an)) ≥ r((bm−1, bm)). According to Definitions 7 and 8, the normal defeat
relation is equivalent to the defeat relation using the last link principle in this paper.
Kakas et al. [19] present a logic of arguments called argumentation logic, where
the foundations of classical logical reasoning are represented from an argumentation
perspective. More precisely, their goal is to integrate into the single argumentative rep-
resentation framework both classical reasoning, as in propositional logic, and defeasible
reasoning.
You et al. [29] define a prioritized argumentative characterization of non-monotonic
reasoning, by casting default reasoning as a form of prioritized argumentation. They
illustrate how the parameterized formulation of priority may be used to allow various
extensions and modifications to default reasoning.
We, and all these approaches, share the idea that an argumentative characterization
of NMR formalisms, like prioritized default logic in Young’s case and hierarchical ab-
stract normative systems in our approach, contributes to make the inference process
more transparent to humans. However, the targeted NMR formalism is different, lead-
ing to different challenges in the representation results. To the best of our knowledge,
no other approach addressed the challenge of an argumentative characterization of pri-
oritized normative reasoning.
The reason we study prioritized normative reasoning in the setting of formal ar-
gumentation is twofold. First, formal argumentation has been recognized as a popular
research area in AI, thanks to its ability to make the inference process more intuitive
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and provide natural explanations for the reasoning process [8]; its flexibility in dealing
with the dynamics of the system; and its appeal in sometimes being more computation-
ally efficient than competing approaches. Second, while some progress has been made
on the use of priorities within argumentation (e.g., [2,21]), how to represent different
approaches for prioritized normative reasoning in argumentation is still a challenging
issue.
8 Conclusions
In this paper we embedded three approaches to prioritized normative reasoning—namely
the Greedy [30], Reduction [5] and Optimization [14] approaches—within the frame-
work of a hierarchical abstract normative system. Within such a system, conditional
norms are represented by a binary relation over literals, and priorities are represented
by natural numbers. Hierarchical abstract normative systems provide an elegant visual-
isation of a normative system, with conflicts shown as two paths to a proposition and
its negation. Since both conflicts and exceptions can be encoded, such systems are in-
herently non-monotonic. In his seminal paper, Dung [10] pointed out that “many of the
major approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning in AI and logic programming are differ-
ent forms of argumentation”, and inspired by this, we described how arguments can
be instantiated as paths through a hierarchical abstract normative system; demonstrated
that this instantiation satisfies certain desirable properties; and described how attacks
and defeats between these arguments can be identified. Defeats in particular are depen-
dent on the priorities associated with the arguments, and several different techniques
have been proposed to lift priorities from argument components — made up of norms
in the context of our work — to the arguments themselves [21]. We demonstrated that
for a total ordering of priorities, lifting priorities to arguments based on the weakest
link principle, evaluated using the stable semantics, is equivalent to Greedy; that lifting
priorities to arguments based on last link and using the stable semantics is equivalent
to Reduction; and that the Optimization approach can be encoded by an argumenta-
tion system which uses weakest link together with the preferred semantics, and which
introduces additional defeats capturing implicit conflicts between arguments.
This last result—which requires a relatively complex argumentative representation—
opens up an interesting avenue for future work, namely in determining which non-
monotonic logics can be easily captured through standard formal argumentation tech-
niques, and which require additional rules or axioms in order to be represented. We note
that on the argumentation side, work on bipolar argumentation (e.g., [9]) has considered
introducing additional defeats between arguments based on some notion of support, and
we intend to investigate how the additional defeats we introduced can be categorized in
such frameworks.
Apart from our representation results, the use of argumentation allows us to make
some useful observations, such as that Reduction will sometimes not reach any conclu-
sions. Furthermore, the use of argumentation can aid in explanation [8]. When imple-
mented, a system building on our approach can help users understand what norms they
should comply with, and why. For large normative systems, the use of stable semantics
to compute Reduction and Optimization results in a high computational overhead, while
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Greedy is computationally efficient. Ultimately, selecting the correct reasoning proce-
dure thus requires giving consideration to both reasoning complexity, and the domain
in which the system will be used.
In closing, our main observations can be summarized as follows. First, from a
normative systems perspective, we know there are many many logics of prioritized
rules/norms, and we consider only three here. The choice we make (Greedy, Reduction
and Optimization) may seem arbitrary. However, many other examples (in particular
detachment procedures not satisfying defeasible deontic detachment) are much easer
to characterize, while the three throughput variants of Greedy, Reduction and Opti-
mization can be derived from the existing results. Furthermore, these three alternatives
display quite diverse behavior, and are illustrative of the various kind of approaches
around.
Second, the results we present are interesting and promising, but the work on repre-
senting prioritized rules/norms using argumentation has only begun, and there are many
open issues. In particular, the restriction to totally ordered systems must be relaxed in
future work.
Third, given the large number of possibilities and the vast existing literature on
normative rules/norms, a different methodology is needed for dealing with prioritized
rules/norms in formal argumentation. Following the work of Dung 2016 [11], a more
axiomatic approach—as we pursue—seems most promising.
Finally, one may wonder why our results have not been shown before, given the long
standing discussion on weakest vs last link at least since the work of Pollock, and the
central role of prioritized rules in many structured argumentation theories like ASPIC+.
The reason, we believe, is that it is easier to study these issues on a small fragment, like
hierarchical abstract normative systems, than on a very general theory like ASPIC+.
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